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The uncertainties of mood:
Reflections on Brad McGann’s Possum
Mette Hjort
In an article entitled “Five Parameters for Story Design in the Short
Fiction Film,” Richard Raskin (1998) argues that “depth” enhanced
by “simplicity” is a factor that enables film stories to function
optimally. Raskin provides three definitions of depth:
One way in which we experience depth in a short film is in the
form of inner space within characters. ... A second way in which
depth can be understood is in terms of the depth of emotion the
film inspires in us. ... Yet a third way depth can be understood is in
terms of underlying meaning, or openness to interpretation (199,
201, 203).
I am primarily interested here in the second definition of depth,
which I take to concern the way in which narrative structure and
visual style are designed to provoke certain emotions in viewers.
Although emotions have emerged recently as key features of
cinematic narration and response, little attention has been paid to
the idea of emotional depth that Raskin foregrounds. What is more,
the task of specifying exactly what emotional depth amounts to
proves to be anything but simple. Is emotional depth a matter of
the experience of certain kinds of emotions rather than others? Do
the relevant emotions have to be experienced at a certain level of
intensity to qualify as a form of depth? Or is emotional depth a
question of provoking emotions that are rarely experienced and
that somehow belong to the kairotic, rather than the more
mundane moments of existence? Perhaps emotional depth arises
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when cinematic texts help to chart new emotional terrain, thereby
guarding against what Susan Feagin (1997, 60) calls “emotional
myopia.” Emotional depth in that case would be intimately
connected with the expansion of our affective repertoire, one of the
functions, ideally, of artworks in Feagin’s view.
 
That emotion is a constitutive feature of cinematic narration and
response is a point that has been developed variously by influential
film scholars. In Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the
Cinema, Murray Smith (1995) convincingly shows that the
representation, recognition, and experience of emotion are central
to the forms of engagement and make-believe that cinematic fictions
encourage. Noël Carroll (1997, 191) makes a related point when he
claims that “emotions are the cement that keeps audiences
connected to the artworks, especially to the narrative fictions, that
they consume.” Carroll’s (1997, 191) claim has a polemical thrust, for
he goes on to insist that the emotions in question are “generally
garden-variety ones--fear, anger, horror, reverence, suspense,
pity, admiration, indignation, awe, repugnance, grief, compassion,
infatuation, comic amusement, and the like,” that is, the very
emotions that are trivialized in psychoanalytic accounts, where
pride of place instead is given to “certain generic, ill-defined forces
like desire and pleasure.” In his ground-breaking work on emotion
and film, Carroll has provided fine-grained accounts of the nature
and function of these garden-variety emotions within cinematic
fictions. In The Philosophy of Horror; or Paradoxes of the Heart, for
example, Carroll (1990) explores the relation between emotion and
genre, arguing that it is a feature of horror fictions to be structured
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by the very categories that are constitutive of the two emotions,
disgust and fear, that together comprise horror. In his more recent
study, Theorizing the Moving Image, Carroll (1996) examines carefully
the complex relations between point-of-view editing and emotion.
He argues, more specifically, that cinematic narration frequently
makes use of the point/object shot “to supply the viewer with the
cause or object of the character’s emotion in order to specify that
emotion in a fine-grained way” (131). Carroll’s account assumes
that agents have certain innate abilities to discern the general
categories of emotion that facial displays express. By identifying the
object or cause of the emotions expressed by a given cinematic
character, the point/object shot in many cases enables viewers to
attribute specific emotions, rather than a general cluster of
emotions, to the fictional characters in question. The concept of
emotion, it would seem, helps to explain a wide range of cinematic
phenomena: why agents are inclined to care about fictional
characters, generic differentiation, and the logic of specific visual
constructions.
Now, what is striking is the fact that influential theorists interested
in the constitutive role played by emotion in film have paid no
attention to the concept of mood. This lacuna is somewhat
surprising, if only because the cognitive psychologists on whom film
theorists draw repeatedly insist that the differences between mood
and emotion are significant enough to require discussion. The idea
that moods are recurrent features of everyday psychologies, but
play no role in cinematic fictions seems counter-intuitive. Far more
compelling as a starting assumption is the idea that a detailed
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exploration of the differences between mood and emotion in the
context of film will help to shed further light on the psychology of
cinematic spectatorship. In what follows, I would like to begin to
explore the significance of mood for film in a brief discussion of a
recent short film entitled Possum (1997), directed by the New
Zealander, Brad McGann.
According to both Raskin and the authors of the press kit
promoting Possum, Brad McGann is intensely attuned to questions
of emotion. Raskin, for example, takes Possum to be a prime
example of a film capable of generating a deep emotional response
in the viewer. And the press kit claims that Possum “is a film about
the subconscious and the primal relationship between people and
their environment.” Possum is further said to reflect the film-
maker’s “continuing interest in making films about the outsider and
the emotional quest [my emphasis] for a sense of place and
belonging.” I would like here to suggest a shift in emphasis, for I
want to argue that Possum is a film designed, not only to generate
specific emotions, but, more importantly, to provoke a certain mood.
In my view, it is this consistent emphasizing of mood that accounts
for some of the film’s most striking visual and narrative features.
What is more, it is the complex interplay between mood and
emotion, with a privileging of mood throughout, that ultimately
contributes to the sense of affective depth that we associate with
this film. In Possum crucial information is repeatedly withheld,
making it impossible for viewers to identify the specific objects and
causes of characters’ emotional responses. The result is a deeply
distressing mood, and this mood is provoked in a largely cumula-
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tive manner that deliberately blocks all forms of cathartic resolution.
The sense of depth in this case is quite literally the result of an ever-
expanding affective abyss linked to diffuse moods, rather than
specific, identifiable emotions. Possum, I would suggest, affords
precisely the kind of affective experience that corresponds to the
idea of depth identified above. For example, the affective
experience encouraged by Possum is importantly marked by
increasing and largely unrelenting intensity.
Before analyzing the role of emotion and mood in McGann’s short
film, it is necessary briefly to identify the key differences between
emotions and moods, as they have been described by cognitive
psychologists. The most important difference concerns the question
of intentionality and its relation to moods and emotions. According
to cognitive conceptions of emotion, the vast majority of emotions
have objects and are therefore intentional states or attitudes.
William Lyons (1980), for example, claims that emotions typically
have both formal and particular objects, the formal objects being
general evaluative categories, and the particular objects the specific
situations that prompt the mobilization of these categories. Moods,
on the other hand, “are often objectless, free-floating” (Jenkins &
Oatley, 1996: 125). That is, it is frequently difficult to identify the
precise cause, and hence object, of a mood. In this sense, the
temporality of moods is quite different from that of emotions, for
whereas emotions in many cases can be accurately traced to a
particular cause at a precise moment in time, the exact causal and
temporal origin of moods tends to be obscure. Another important
temporal difference between moods and emotions has been noted
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by Oatley and Jenkins, who rightly point out that moods tend to
last longer than punctual emotions. Indeed, moods can last “for
hours, days, or weeks, sometimes as a low intensity background”
(125). Moods, it appears, tend to be “produced in a cumulative
fashion over time” (Davidson, 1994: 53), whereas emotions are
prompted by punctual evaluations of specific situations. In most
cases, punctually experienced emotions subside as soon as agents
cease to direct their attention toward the relevant formal and
particular objects. Moods, on the other hand, can assume a some-
what autonomous existence and can be more difficult to influence
and manipulate than emotions. The very possibility of controlling or
manipulating emotions hinges on an agent’s ability correctly to
identify the evaluative categories and particular situations that
together cause the emotions. Inasmuch as moods lack the
intentional dimensions of emotions, they are much more difficult to
control. Finally, according to some theorists, such as Ekman and
Davidson (1994), emotions and moods serve quite different
functions.  Davidson claims that whereas the “primary function of
emotion is to modulate or bias action,” the “primary function of
moods ... is to modulate or bias cognition” (52).  Emotions, that is,
provide a punctual motivation for action, while moods color our
general view of the world.  Davidson thus defines the general
relation between emotion and mood as follows: “Moods provide
the affective background, the emotional color, to all that we do.
Emotions can be viewed as phasic perturbations that are
superimposed on this background activity” (52).
The narrative strategy in Possum is to encourage viewers to focus
on notions of threat, while withholding the kind of information that
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would make possible a precise identification of the source of
imminent danger. In a couple of key sequences Possum provokes
certain negative emotions, such as pity or fear, by confronting
viewers with particular situations that are presented as somehow
tragic or dangerous. But these emotions, which have precise,
identifiable objects, are used primarily to channel the viewer’s
thoughts in a certain direction and to instil certain expectations.
Most of the sequences in Possum promote ambiguity and subtextual
complexity, and are designed to block intentional emotions and to
contribute instead to a brooding sense of generalized anxiety, that
is, a mood.
The evocation of intentional emotions occurs primarily in three
scenes: the opening scene in which Little Man (Martin Taylor)
comes upon a trapped and dead animal together with Dad
(Stephen Papps); the crisis scene in which Missy (Alexia Verdonk-
schot) teases, and is bitten by Kid (Eve-Marie Brandish); and the
disclosure scene in which Kid is discovered dead, caught in a trap
like the wild animals with which she identified.  There are a number
of important differences between these emotion-provoking scenes
and the mood-enhancing scenes. The characters’ emotional displays
in the former scenes are less ambiguous than in the latter, where
facial expressions tend to be puzzling or non-communicative and to
resist an interpretive activity involving fine-grained emotional attri-
butions. In the emotion-generating scenes, the emotions expressed
by characters are linked to the kinds of objects that typically and
conventionally cause the emotions in question. The situation is quite
different in the mood-enhancing scenes, for here it is frequently a
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matter of aligning an emotional expressivity with situations that, in
the absence of further explanation, seem unlikely to cause the emo-
tions expressed by the characters. And what is withheld is precisely
the information, or the explanation, that would forge a fit between
the expressed emotion and its cause.
Not surprisingly, the opening sequence plays a framing role and
thus emphasizes intentional emotions, rather than objectless moods.
The viewer witnesses a series of shots of tall trees and a man and
young boy walking in a forest. These shots are accompanied by
bird song combined with non-naturalistic sound from an unidentifi-
able source. A subsequent shot reveals a dead rabbit, and as the
viewer contemplates the image, the following thought is articulated
by a voice that is readily attributable to the young boy: “Dad says
the shock of the trap killed him. Their hearts stop beating when
they know they’ve been caught.” The shot of the dead animal is
followed by a reaction shot of the boy looking mournful. His grief
at the situation is underscored by his downcast eyes and deep sigh.
The acting and editing here clearly identify the dead animal as the
cause of the young boy’s sadness.  What is more, the fit between
the expressed emotion and its identified cause is conventional and
unproblematic: the sight of a furry dead animal is the kind of thing
that upsets young children. As the father says “come on” and
urges the boy to follow him, the child contemplates the trees and
internally whispers the following words: “sometime a possum get
caught too.”  That the phrase somehow points to subsequent events
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Shot 3 Shot 4
in the narrative is a hypothesis that the viewer may be quick to
formulate. The child’s expressed emotions, combined with the
ominous whisper, serve to construe the punctually represented
situation and the larger context within which it figures as one
involving death and related emotions. By the end of the opening
sequence, the viewer’s thoughts have been turned toward death
and violence as a result of a fine cinematic use of the language of
emotion. Any sadness that the viewer might feel during the
opening moments of the film will be prompted by a particular
evaluation of the dead animal and the boy’s response to it. At the
same time, the viewer has reason to expect that the kind of
negative emotion experienced at this point will be reanimated by
subsequent events. What the precise object of these subsequent
emotional episodes will be is, of course, unclear. And the narrative
strategy of Possum is precisely to leave the viewer guessing as to
the nature of the victim and the source of the threat, for in the
ensuing scenes, with the exception of the crisis scene, and the scene
in which Kid is found dead, the emphasis is placed fully on
ambiguity. As the early negative emotions subside they are
replaced by dark, distressing moods that are fueled importantly by
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an anticipation of violence and a distressing inability to localize its
vehicle or agent.
In Possum, Brad McGann employs at least three strategies to
provoke and continuously foster a dark mood of generalized,
objectless anxiety. The strategy of norm flouting is used early on in
the film and involves the staging of emotional displays that seem
somehow to conflict with, or to be poorly aligned with, the
situation that prompts them. I am thinking, for example, of the
scene in which Dad, Little Man, and Missy are seated at the table
eating dinner. Missy runs her finger around the edge of her glass
while looking intensely at Little Man, who observes her with a look
of calm concentration. The emphasis is on virtually immobilized
figures and subtle expressions. When Missy suddenly sticks out her
tongue, Little Man unexpectedly erupts into loud hysterical
laughter, which in turn prompts the previously surly, non-communi-
cative father to pound the table with his fist.  In the absence of
Shot 12 Shot 15
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further information, the sudden outburst of loud, hysterical
laughter seems like an inappropriate response to Missy’s behavior,
just as the father’s angry fist fits poorly with the situation, at least
as it has been presented to the viewer. What we have here is the
foregrounding of a problematic relation between unambiguous
expressions of hilarity and anger, on the one hand, and their
particular causes or objects, on the other. The viewer’s perception
of a clash between the emotional displays and their apparent causes
has the effect of highlighting the viewer’s lack of information about
the relevant family and its internal dynamics.
The second strategy involves, not the flouting of normative
relations between emotions and their causes, but the staging of
essentially ambiguous emotional displays. In this case it is a matter of
the viewer being unable to identify the relevant emotional displays
with any kind of precision. An example of a fundamentally
ambiguous emotional display is Little Man’s smile in response to the
sequence of events that includes Kid being teased by Missy and the
father slamming a hammer onto a metal Possum trap. On a first
viewing, it is impossible to tell whether the smile expresses a sense
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of sympathy for Kid, a gleeful delight in having stayed out of the
conflict, or a mocking attitude towards the father’s outburst.
Dark, objectless moods are further fostered by a third strategy,
which involves systematically withholding emotional displays in situ-
ations that appear to be highly charged emotionally. This strategy
hinges on a highly restrained, non-communicative acting style, which
is expertly executed by, in particular, Martin Taylor (Little Man)
and Stephen Papps (Dad). An example is the scene in which Little
Man and Dad exchange looks as the child prepares to sleep.
Shot 69 Shot 70
The viewer’s growing sense of foreboding is in no way alleviated at
this point, for while the exchange of looks and absence of explicit
verbal communication create an atmosphere of emotional intensity,
the facial expressions deliberately withhold information about the
characters’ inner states. As a result the viewer is unable even to
begin to chart the emotional landscape in the scene in question.
The three mood-inducing strategies employed in Possum have the
overall effect of placing the viewer in a situation of profound uncer-
tainty. The viewer is systematically made to understand that he or
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she lacks crucial information about the nature of the characters’
interactions and the forces that determine their lives. The negative
emotions prompted in the viewer during the early moments of the
film set the stage for a generalized anxiety that is fueled by various
forms of uncertainty. The film is unrelenting in this regard, for it
deliberately deprives the viewer of the kind of cathartic moments
traditionally associated with tragic narrative. At no point is the
viewer able to determine the cause of the crises and tragic events
that plague the family. Instead, the viewer is left to choose between
a number of possible causes, including supernatural forces and
sexual transgression. That is, the narrative strategy adopted makes
it impossible for the viewer retroactively to identify the underlying
cause of the anxiety experienced in the course of the film. The
viewer is thus denied the possibility of transforming a dark,
objectless mood into a clearly defined emotional state with a precise
starting point and conclusion. And this privileging of mood over
emotion clearly identifies Brad McGann as a quintessentially
modern practitioner of tragic fiction.
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